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INTRODUCTION
The use of acquitted conduct at sentencing is a highly contentious
practice in sentencing theory, policy and practice. This Article
provides a critical analysis of acquitted conduct sentencing under the
relevant conduct provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“Guidelines”) by tracing the constitutional and statutory arguments
within the conceptual framework governing current sentencing
practices in the United States. In federal court and many state courts 1
across the United States, once a defendant is convicted, judges are
permitted to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on relevant conduct,
of which he was acquitted of at trial, if the alleged conduct can be
established by a preponderance of the evidence at a sentencing
hearing. 2
The 2007 case of Robert Mercado in California offers a useful
example. 3 Mercado was charged, tried by a jury, and subsequently

1. Enag Ngov, Judicial Nullification of Juries: Use of Acquitted Conduct at
Sentencing, 76 TENN. L. REV. 235, 236–37 (2009) (surveying state cases) (citing Kevin R.
Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 523, 528
(1993) (noting that “[n]early every state allows sentencing courts to engage freely in realoffense sentencing as a matter of discretion.”)); but see Danielle M. Hansen, The Absentee
Post-Conviction Constitutional Safeguards, 28 TOURO L. REV. 563, 599 (2012) (noting that
the First and Second Departments within New York State’s Appellate Division prohibit a
sentencing judge from considering acquitted conduct).
2. Megan Sterback, Getting Time for an Acquitted Crime: The Unconstitutional Use
of Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing and New York’s Call for Change, 26 TOURO L. REV.
1223, 1224–25 (2011) (internal citations omitted). See also Ngov, supra note 1, at 236–37
n.11; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (2012).
3. James J. Bilsborrow, Sentencing Acquitted Conduct to the Post-Booker Dustbin, 49
WM. MARY L. REV. 289, 290 (2007) (citing United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 655,
658–59 (9th Cir. 2007)).
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convicted on various counts of drug conspiracy. 4 Additionally,
Mercado was charged and acquitted of participation in three murders,
the commission of violent crimes in the aid of racketeering, and assault
with a deadly weapon. 5 Based upon his drug convictions, the
Guidelines recommended a punishment of thirty to thirty-seven
months’ imprisonment. 6 Yet at Mercado’s sentencing, the sentencing
judge set aside the jury’s acquittals and considered the acquitted
conduct per the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines and
imposed a sentence of twenty-years, increasing the punishment
recommended by the Guidelines—and the jury verdict—by over
seventeen years. 7
The term ‘acquitted conduct sentencing’ considers “acts for which
the offender was criminally charged and formally adjudicated not
guilty at trial” 8 and is exercised where there is “any reliance on such
acts by the sentencing judge as a basis for enhancing an offender’s
sentence.” 9 Acquitted conduct—which is characterized as ‘relevant
conduct’ under the United States Sentencing Guideline regime—
encompasses both criminal conduct alleged to have occurred
contemporaneously with the charges of conviction and alleged prior
criminal conduct. 10
The hallmark of the American judicial process is the right to trial
by jury 11 and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to
sustain a conviction. 12 The significance of this protection can be
gleaned from its historical recognition as an “unassailable right” dating
back to at least the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215. 13 The system
4. Mercado, 474 F.3d at 655.
5. Id. at 658–59.
6. Id. at 659.
7. Id.
8. Barry L. Johnson, If at First You Don’t Succeed—Abolishing the Use of Acquitted
Conduct in Guideline Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REV. 153, 157–58 (1996) (providing definition
of acquitted conduct).
9. Id. at 157.
10. Id. See also Sterback, supra note 2, at 1230 (“While the pre-Guidelines approach
allowed a judge to use unlimited discretion in sentencing, the Guidelines only allow the
judge to consider factors of relevant conduct.”) (emphasis added). This definition of
acquitted conduct sentencing is adopted throughout this Article and, except where noted
otherwise, is used in tandem with the term “relevant conduct” since relevant conduct
includes acquitted conduct.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also Robert Alan
Semones, A Parade of Horribles: Uncharged Relevant Conduct, the Federal Prosecutorial
Loophole, Tails Wagging Dogs in Federal Sentencing Law, and United States v. Fitch, 46
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 313, 315 (2013) (“One of the most impressive American judicial
processes is the trial by jury.”).
12. Sterback, supra note 2, at 1225 (citations omitted).
13. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151–54 (1968) (detailing the fundamental
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of jury fact-finding in colonial times was developed from the English
system of criminal law, 14 where criminal proceedings were submitted
to a jury after being initiated by an indictment containing “all the facts
and circumstances which constitute the offence . . . stated with such
certainty
and
precision,
that
the
defendant
. . . may be enabled to determine the species of offence they constitute,
in order that he may prepare his defense accordingly . . . and that there
may be no doubt as to the judgment which should be given, if the
defendant be convicted.” 15 When Blackstone published his treatise in
the 1760s, the English speaking people had enjoyed the right of trial by
jury in criminal cases for more than 500 years, and common law
lawyers and judges, from Bracton in 1250 to Lord Coke in 1620 to
Blackstone, 16 had come to “revere their unique institution of liberty.” 17
The fundamental role of the jury in the criminal arena played a vital
role in the founding of the United States and is enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution, Article III, §2 and its Sixth Amendment. 18
Notwithstanding the historical origins of the jury, why is the use
of acquitted conduct to enhance a defendant’s sentence worth
considering? The issue is important for three reasons. First, the use of
acquitted conduct sentencing implicates the justifications for
punishment by the state. Contemporary sentencing practices in the
United States have made increasing use of imprisonment and have
placed greater restrictions on non-custodial sentences. 19 Thus, the
right to a jury trial in the criminal context and the historical record of its origin in commonlaw England).
14. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE
PROTESTANT REFORMATION ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 226–28, 306–29 (2003)
(citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *368–82).
15. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478–79 (2000). See JOHN FREDERICK
ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 72 (John Jervis et
al. eds., 23 ed. 1905); JOHN PRENTISS BISHOP, LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: OR,
PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 80 (2d ed. 1872).
16. See United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 388–97 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(Merritt, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 393 (quoting 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 386–87
(George E. Woodbine ed., 1968)).
18. See THURSTON GREENE, THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION: A SOURCEBOOK
AND GUIDE TO THE IDEAS, TERMS, AND VOCABULARY USED BY THE FRAMERS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 860–67 (Stuart B. Flexner et al. eds., 1991); Bilsborrow,
supra note 3, at 294–95.
19. ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 71–74 (5th ed. 2010)
(distinguishing aims of the criminal justice system from the justifications of punishment).
See also Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, ECONOMIST
(July
22,
2010),
http://www.economist.com/node
/16636027 (noting that as of 2010 there were between 2.3 and 2.4 million Americans behind
bars in the U.S).
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imposition of state sanctioned punishment requires justification not
only to counter the proposition that “anyone who commits any offence
forfeits all rights, and may be dealt with by the state in whatever
manner the courts decree,” 20 but also to preserve the communicative
value of punishment. Second, the use of acquitted conduct at
sentencing undermines the foundational principle of the American
criminal justice system: “[T]hat it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free.” 21 Third, the practical
consequences of acquitted conduct sentencing has resulted in dramatic
increases in the length of defendants’ sentences—sometimes resulting
in life imprisonment 22—and has been criticized as “Kafka-esque,” 23
“repugnant,” 24 “uniquely malevolent,” 25 and “pernicious,” 26 leading
one juror to openly complain to the judge having read news accounts
depicting the jury’s verdict having been ignored at sentencing. 27
This Article argues that use of acquitted conduct at sentencing
should be prohibited on both constitutional and normative grounds. To
substantiate this claim, four particular aspects are explored: First, why
is acquitted conduct considered relevant at sentencing? Second, what
is the prevailing conceptual framework, if any, that underpins the

20. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 74.
21. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
22. See United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 172 (1st Cir. 1995) (“At sentencing,
under the Guidelines, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
Lombard had used his illegally possessed firearm to commit “another offense”: the same
murders of which he had been acquitted in the state court. The resulting Guidelines
sentence was a mandatory term of life in prison, which Maine law would not have required
even had defendant been convicted of the murders. Lombard thus received a life sentence
based on the federal court's finding that it was more likely than not that Lombard had
committed the murders of which he had been acquitted.”).
23. Ngov, supra note 1, at 298; Farnaz Farkish, Docking the Tail that Wags the Dog:
Why Congress Should Abolish the Use of Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing and How Courts
Should Treat Acquitted Conduct After United States v. Booker, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 101,
101 (2007); Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 290 n.8; United States v. Ibanga, 454 F. Supp. 2d
532, 536 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2006) (comparing consideration of acquitted conduct to the fictional
use of “non-final acquittals” in Kafka’s The Trial, which permitted an accused to be
acquitted but allowed him to potentially be re-arrested at a later time for the same particular
offense) (citations omitted).
24. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 169–70 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Eric
Tirschwell & Michael Eisenkraft, “Repugnant” and “Malevolent”: The Use of Acquitted
Conduct in Federal Sentencing, N.Y. L.J. 4 (2009).
25. United States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764, 776–77 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
26. United States v. Papakee, 573 F.3d 569, 578 (8th Cir. 2009) (Bright, J.,
concurring).
27. Jim McElhatton, ‘Juror No. 6’ Stirs Debate on Sentencing, WASH. TIMES (May 3,
2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/3/juror-no-6-questions-rules-ofsentencing/?page=all.
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American system of punishment, and moreover, where and how does
the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing fit in the current prevailing
sentencing ideology in the United States? Third, what are the issues
and consequences emanating from the use of acquitted conduct under
the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines? Fourth and finally,
while it is outside the scope of this Article to offer a comprehensive
solution or alternative to the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing, the
key observation is that, since the common thread linking the
constitutional and normative issues emanates from the fragmented
nature of sentencing policy in the United States, the solution must start
with re-conceptualizing the theories underlying sentencing.
A comprehensive analysis of acquitted conduct sentencing
requires contextualizing the historical evolution of sentencing, penal
policy, and the constitutional limitations on punishment. Part I begins
with some preliminary issues, briefly recapitulating the development of
modern sentencing philosophy which gave rise to the use of acquitted
conduct at sentencing. In Part II the fragmented and muddled nature of
the prevailing conceptual framework, which underpins contemporary
sentencing policy, is set out as a basis for Part III’s examination of the
consequences of acquitted conduct sentencing. Finally, Part IV offers a
conclusion and notes that the response to the problems arising from
acquitted conduct sentencing must start with a re-conceptualization of
sentencing itself to reflect a primary rationale or model.
I. INDETERMINATE SENTENCING VERSUS DETERMINATE SENTENCING
UNDER THE GUIDELINES
The debate over determinate sentencing versus indeterminate
sentencing has been characterized as a debate between proponents of
the so-called medical or treatment model of corrections and those who
favor the punitive model. 28 The Model Penal Code, an influential piece
of draft legislation written during the early 1960s by the American Law
Institute, clearly shows the significance of rehabilitative aims at the
time: Courts were not to sentence offenders to imprisonment if,
amongst other things, “the defendant is particularly likely to respond
affirmatively to probationary treatment.” 29 While the 1960s are often
regarded as the “heyday of rehabilitationism,” 30 and the 1970s as the
28. See WILLIAM TAYLOR & MICHAEL BRASWELL, ISSUES IN POLICE AND CRIMINAL
PSYCHOLOGY 19–21 (1978).
29. Francis A. Allen, Rehabilitation, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON
THEORY AND POLICY 1 (Andrew Ashworth et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009) (quoting MODEL PENAL
CODE § 7.01(2)(j), (k) (1962)).
30. Id (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(2) (1962)).
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beginning of a “catastrophic decline” of the rehabilitative ideal, the
rehabilitative aims or goals of imprisonment have nevertheless
remained part of penal practice and penal theory to this day. 31
However, before turning to a discussion of the historical evolution
and shift from indeterminate to determinate sentencing, it is important
to address the logically antecedent question of why the state has a right
to punish in the first place. Similarly, what are the aims and purposes
of punishment imposed by the state and why do they matter? While
there are multiple justifications for state punishment, these
justifications are intertwined with the purpose and meaning of
punishment. The common thread that relates the problems of the
indeterminate and determinate sentencing eras is the disruption to the
justifications, purposes and meanings of punishment by the state.
Towards this end, Part I.A. provides an outline for justifications of
punishment by the state. Part I.B. provides a brief sketch of the various
aims and purposes of punishment. Part I.C. discusses the foundational
basis for indeterminate sentencing and explores the role of judicial fact
finding during that period. This Section also identifies the problems
that arose during the indeterminate sentencing regime leading to
significant reforms in 1980s. Part I.D. presents the shift to determinate
sentencing. Part I.E. outlines the structural and legal framework for
consideration of acquitted conduct under the Guidelines’ relevant
conduct provisions.
A. Justifications for Punishment by the State
Criminal punishment is not merely the imposition of pain allowed
by the law. 32 It is the most powerful and the most widely used device
that the law has at its disposal. 33 It is also the “crudest and most
frightening” device at the law’s disposal. 34 Why does the state have a
right to punish? In a related vein, when does the state acquire its right
to punish? These questions implicate social contract theories, 35 or
more pragmatically, the state’s role in carrying out a displacement
function that is essential to social co-operation. 36 “The justification of
31. Id.
32. HYMAN GROSS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: A CONCISE MORAL CRITIQUE 9
(2012).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 74–75; Neil MacCormick & David Garland,
Sovereign States and Vengeful Victims: The Problem of the Right to Punish, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 18–20 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds.,
1998).
36. See id.
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punishment tout court is surrounded by satellite questions of
justification that are of great importance in their own right”: 37 Are we
justified in making some particular item of conduct punishable? 38 By
what standard are we to attach criminal liability? 39
Then there is the question of what sentences to prescribe for those
crimes. 40 Given the huge and complex debate surrounding these
issues, they cannot be dealt with in-depth and are outside the scope of
this Section. Suffice it to say that the importance of punishment being
in the hands of state institutions rather than victims or other individuals
resides both in a mixture of rule-of-law values and the need for the
state to ensure peaceable cooperation. 41 Though many other important
issues are involved in resolving these questions of justification, a
settled view of what makes punishment right is essential. The most
basic requirement for liability to criminal punishment is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of all the elements of the offence, as well as all
factors that increase the range of penal sanctions. 42
As noted by Justice Brennan: 43
[t]he requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital
role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused
during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest[s] of immense
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his
liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would
be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that
values the good name and freedom of every individual should not
condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is
reasonable doubt about his guilt. . . . There is always, in litigation, a
margin of error, representing error in fact-finding, which both
parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an
interest of transcending value—as a criminal defendant his
liberty—this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of
placing on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty
unless the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the
44
fact-finder of his guilt.

The “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement is a
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

GROSS, supra note 32, at 8.
Id.
See id. at 9–10.
See id.
ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 74–75.
GROSS, supra note 32, at 9.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Id. at 363–64, cited in GROSS, supra note 32, at 9.
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foundational principle of American criminal justice and traces its roots
to Blackstone’s eighteenth century principle that “it is better that ten
guilty persons escape than one innocent suffer.” 45
B. Aims and Purposes of Punishment
Throughout history, several explanations have been used to
explain the aims and purposes of punishment.46 A citizen may
demand:
[f]irst, get them off the streets; keep them away from us. Make
them suffer: they deserve it. Teach them a lesson they will not
forget. And let their pain and sufferings be an example to others.
Maybe then, having been punished, someday, somehow, these
criminals will feel remorse, change their attitudes, and
productively reintegrate into society. 47

Drawing upon concepts and perspectives implicit in the Bible and
the works of, amongst others, Plato, Hobbes, Beccaria, Kant, Bentham,
and numerous contemporary commentators, 48 legal scholars have
explained the aims of punishment as “reinforcement of sovereign
authority,” 49 “incapacitation,” 50 “retribution,” 51 “deterrence,” 52 and
“rehabilitation.” 53 While each of these aims suggests a distinct
normative foundation for punishment used to justify various strategies
of response to criminal behavior, they all reflect one common
Punishment
justification: punishment is communicative. 54
communicates to the offender the censure or condemnation that they
deserve for their crimes. 55 Therefore, the formal criminal sanction

45. Michael H. Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1550, 1566 (1981) (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *27).
46. Elizabeth E. Joh, “If it Suffices to Accuse”: United States v. Watts and the
Reassessment of Acquittals, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 887 (1999).
47. Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of
Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (1990) (citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. Joh, supra note 46, at 887 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 48
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977)).
50. A.E. Bottoms & Roger Brownsword, Incapacitation and “Vivid Danger”, in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra note 29, at 83–84.
51. R.A. Duff, Punishment, Retribution and Communication, in PRINCIPLED
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra note 29, at 126–27.
52. Jeremy Bentham, Punishment and Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING:
READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra note 29, at 53–56.
53. Allen, supra note 29, at 1–10. See also ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 71–74
(distinguishing aims of the criminal justice system from the justifications of punishment).
54. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 90 (citations omitted); Joh, supra note 46, at 887–88.
55. Id.
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imposed through sentencing is “not simply the governmental apparatus
that responds to crime and criminals,” 56 but also “plays a powerful
teaching function,” 57 which reflects the “dominant social themes of the
moment.” 58
C. Indeterminate Sentencing
1.

Indeterminate Sentencing and Judicial Fact Finding

The original Model Penal Code’s embrace of rehabilitation as a
main penal purpose represented an early twentieth-century view that
rehabilitation was morally and scientifically superior to retribution in
criminal sentencing. 59 The rehabilitative ideal—that sentences should
seek to reform the criminal tendencies of offenders—was tied to a
specific setting for treatment growing out of developments in clinical
psychology. 60 As such, an indeterminate sentencing regime took
hold. 61 In this period of indeterminate sentencing, each offender’s
unique characteristics were taken into account through individualized
sentencing, thereby, emphasizing the rehabilitative goal of sentences. 62
The judge’s role under this regime was therapeutic, likened to a
physician: crime was a “moral disease,” whose cure was entrusted to
experts in the criminal justice field, one of whom was the judge. 63 As a
consequence, different standards of proof and evidence evolved
between the trial stage, 64 which required proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, 65 and the sentencing stage, 66 which only required proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. 67 The rationale for this approach was
straightforward: to limit the kind of information that a judge should get
at sentencing would prohibit them from exercising their “clinical”
56. Joh, supra note 46, at 887.
57. Id. at 902 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 888.
59. Sarah Armstrong, Bureaucracy, Private Prisons, and the Future of Penal Reform, 7
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 280 (2003) (citing Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The
Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (2000)); Allen, supra note
29, at 1.
60. Armstrong, supra note 59, at 280.
61. Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much
Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 695 (2010) (tracing the roots of
indeterminate sentencing).
62. Donald W. Dowd, The Sentencing Controversy: Punishment and Policy in the War
Against Drugs, 40 VILL. L. REV. 301, 302 (1995). See Allen, supra note 29, at 1–5.
63. Gertner, supra note 61, at 695 (citations omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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role. 68
In 1949, the U.S. Supreme Court constitutionally approved this
philosophical and procedural approach in Williams v. New York. 69 The
Williams court emphasized that “[r]eformation and rehabilitation of
offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence” 70
and, thus, having the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant’s previous life and characteristics was essential for
“sentencing experts” to exercise their discretion. 71 For the Williams
Court, the rehabilitative ideal not only justified entrusting judges and
parole officials with enormous sentencing discretion, but also called for
sentencing judges and, by extension, parole officers, to be “freed from
any procedural rules that might limit the sound exercise of their
discretion.” 72 In 1970, Congress codified Williams in 18 U.S.C. §
3577. Congress provided a statutory footing for the discretionary
consideration of relevant conduct, which includes both past and
contemporaneous acquitted conduct, as well as un-adjudicated conduct
at sentencing. 73
2.

Problems With Indeterminate Sentencing

During the indeterminate sentencing era, judges and parole
authorities had the most power relative to other “sentencing players.” 74
Each case was resolved on its own merits; any standards or rules
evolved from the day-to-day experience of individual judges and
confined to his courtroom. 75 However, there were several problems
with indeterminate sentencing, which sowed the seeds of an
institutional shakeup. 76 Judges had no training in how to exercise their
considerable discretion. 77 Sentencing was not taught in law schools;
concepts such as deterrence and rehabilitation were not reflected in

68. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1941). See generally Reitz, supra
note 1, at 528–30 (providing a full discussion of the facts of Williams).
69. Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 1, 4.
70. Id. at 4–5.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id.
73. Erica K. Beutler, A Look at the Use of Acquitted Conduct in Sentencing, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 809, 814 (1998). Section 3577 was re-codified to 18 U.S.C. §
3661 after the sentencing reforms of the 1980s. See infra Part I.D.
74. Gertner, supra note 61, at 696.
75. Id.
76. Id. See Berman, supra note 69, at 8 & n.41. See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 3–34, 59–123 (1976) (discussing the
failures of the rehabilitative model); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 162–82
(1975) (exploring the failings of the rehabilitative model).
77. Gertner, supra note 61, at 696–97.
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judicial training. 78 Next, wide disparity in sentencing among both
offenders and offences was the norm, leading the chief proponent of
structured sentencing to describe this period as “unruly,” “arbitrary”
and “discriminatory.” 79 Thus, so long as the federal substantive law
was composed of “overlapping categories and muddled distinctions
among offenses,” 80 federal sentencing was bound to seem “lawless.” 81
Beginning in the 1970s, the assumptions behind the consensus on
individualized sentencing with its rehabilitative goal were under attack
from all sides. 82 From the left, there was a growing mistrust of the
“therapeutic state.” 83 From the right, critics called for more and more
mandatory sentences to punish and deter; exercising any discretion was
considered, at best, a weak, Bennite solution. 84 Retribution was
advocated not as revenge, but as “just deserts.” 85 Nearly twenty-five
years after the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal and the
implementation of a just deserts model of punishment, mass
incarceration for significant periods of time appears to be the common
theme in the United States. Justice is harsher in the United States than
in any other developed country. 86 As of 2010, there were between 2.3
and 2.4 million Americans behind bars; 87 including parole, probation or
supervised release, one adult in thirty-one is under “correctional”
supervision in the United States. 88 And perhaps more troubling, the
United States has the highest rate of prisoners (748) while Iceland (55)
had the lowest. 89
D. Determinate Sentencing Under the Guidelines: Structure and
Application
Driven by the concerns with indeterminate sentencing, Congress

78. Id. (citing KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 23 (1998)).
79. Id. at 697 (quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER 49 (1972)).
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Robert H. Joost, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Is It Possible, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 195, 202 (1997)).
82. Dowd, supra note 62, at 302.
83. NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCE
THERAPY (1971).
84. Dowd, supra note 62, at 303.
85. Id. at 303. See Allen, supra note 29, at 29.
86. Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, ECONOMIST
(July 22, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16636027.
87. Id. Note that this figure includes both state and federal prisoners.
88. Id.
89. Id.

YALINCAK FINAL

2014]

8/21/2014 4:07 PM

ACQUITTED CONDUCT SENTENCING

687

enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA). 90 In an attempt to
address the unpredictability of sentencing, the SRA created the United
States Sentencing Commission (Commission) to provide “certainty and
fairness in [congruence with] the purposes of sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct . . . .” 91
Towards this end, the SRA attempted to introduce standardization,
precision, and impartiality into federal sentencing decisions by
establishing Guideline for sentencing. 92 Parole, a hallmark of the
rehabilitative model, was also abolished. 93
The centerpiece of the Guidelines was a grid containing 258
cells. 94 The Guideline grid’s vertical axis consists of forty-three
offense levels, reflecting a base severity score for the crime
committed. 95 The Guideline grid’s horizontal axis consists of six
criminal history categories and provides adjustments based on the
offender’s past conviction record. 96 After a plea of guilt or conviction
at trial, a pre-sentence investigation is conducted by a probation officer
and a pre-sentence report (“PSR”) is submitted to the Court to enable
the judge to “meaningfully exercise its sentencing authority” under
§3553 of the SRA.” 97 The PSR provides a preliminary mathematical
calculation of both the “offense level” and “criminal history.” 98 In
determining the defendant’s offense level, the PSR guideline
calculation reflects the base offense guideline level corresponding to
the defendant’s conviction or the relevant conduct underlying the
conviction, whichever is higher, and then adjusts the offense level for
specific offense characteristics and special instructions contained in the

90. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–
3559, 3561–3566, 3571–3574, 3581–3586 (2000), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2000)); Joh,
supra note 46, at 892–93 (“In particular, the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
responded to critiques of indeterminate sentencing with an attempt to introduce
standardization, precision, and impartiality into federal sentencing decisions.”) (citations
omitted).
91. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
GOALS
OF
SENTENCING
REFORM
11
(Nov.
2004),
available
at
http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/08-26221.pdf.
92. Joh, supra note 46, at 892.
93. Id. at 893.
94. Sherod Thaxton, Determining “Reasonableness Without A Reason”? Federal
Appellate Review Post-Rita v United States, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1885, 1887 (2008) (citations
omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(c).
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(d).
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section. 99 After determining the offense level, the PSR determines the
defendant’s criminal history category. 100 The PSR then identifies the
cell at which the factors intersect; the corresponding cell provides the
recommended range within which the judge may sentence a defendant
(the “Guideline Sentencing Range”). 101 However, prior to sentencing
of the defendant, both the Government and the Defendant may file their
objections to the calculations or factual statements in the PSR. 102 At
sentencing, the sentencing judge resolves any disputes or
disagreements based on a “preponderance of the evidence” standard
and imposes a sentence. 103
E. Structural Framework for Acquitted Conduct Under the Guidelines’
Relevant Conduct Provisions
1. Modified Real-Offense System
In developing the Guidelines, the Commission adopted a
“modified real-offense” system, which “blends the constraints of the
offense of conviction” with “the reality of the defendant’s actual
offense conduct in order to gauge the seriousness of that conduct for
sentencing purposes.” 104 This modified real offense system is premised
on the consideration of all relevant conduct, regardless of the jury
verdict and regardless of whether the relevant conduct was amongst the
charged offences. 105 For instance, a defendant who is charged and
convicted of fraud and money laundering offences may, without further
charge or conviction, be sentenced using the base Guideline offence
level for pre-meditated murder if the court finds by a preponderance of
the evidence that a murder had taken place.106 Similarly, a defendant
who is charged with drug and firearm offences, but acquitted of the
firearm offence may, nevertheless, be sentenced using the base

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(f).
103. See Thaxton, supra note 94, at 1887–88.
104. William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 497 (1990).
105. See, e.g., Criminal Law-Federal Sentencing-Ninth Circuit Affirms 262-Month
Sentence Based on Uncharged Murder, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1860, 1861–62 (2012). For a
thorough, yet not entirely convincing defense of the ‘modified real offense’ system, see Julie
R. O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense System,
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1342 (1997).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Fitch, 659 F.3d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 2011) (providing an
example of this factual scenario), discussed in Semones, supra note 11.
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Guideline offence level for firearm related offences.107
The
consideration of “real conduct” at sentencing operates through the
relevant conduct provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guideline
Manual 108 and the “no limitation” language of 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which
provides that there shall be no limitation placed on the type of
information the Court may consider at sentencing. 109
Acquitted conduct sentencing continued after the enactment of the
Guidelines for four reasons. First, as discussed in Part II infra, the
SRA fails to conceptualize any coherent sentencing theory. The SRA
simply made the application of the Guidelines mandatory without any
guidance to judges on how the various purposes listed in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) were incorporated into the relevant Guideline ranges. Second,
the holdings of Williams, discussed above, were re-codified by
Congress with the exact same language as before with the passage of
the SRA without any regard to the new philosophy rooted in retribution
and incapacitation. 110
Third, a mere two years after the SRA and the shift in penal
philosophy on the federal level, the Supreme Court decided McMillan
v. Pennsylvania, 111 originally a state court case, which coined the term
“sentencing factor.” 112 Per McMillan, a “sentencing factor” is a fact
not found by a jury, but found by a judge by a preponderance of the
evidence at sentencing, which affects the sentencing range. 113 In
McMillan, the Court rejected a Sixth Amendment challenge concluding
that a sentencing factor does not constitute additional punishment; it
merely limits a judge’s sentencing discretion. 114
107. See, e.g., United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008) (providing an
example of this factual scenario).
108. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3–.4 (2012).
109. Sterback, supra note 2, at 1232–33; Gerald Leonard & Christine Dieter,
Punishment Without Conviction: Controlling the Use of Unconvicted Conduct in Federal
Sentencing, 17 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 260, 273–74 (2012) (citation omitted). See Berman,
supra note 69, at 17–23.
110. Beutler, supra note 73, at 827–28; 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012).
111. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). For federal counterpart see Harris
v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
112. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2154 (2013).
113. Id.
114. 477 U.S. 79. In McMillan, a Pennsylvania state court convicted the defendants of
various felonies covered by the Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act. Id. at
82. The Act provided in relevant part that a person convicted of certain enumerated felonies
is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment if the sentencing
judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant “visibly possessed a
firearm” during the commission of the felony. PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982). Following
the defendants’ conviction, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania gave notice that it would
proceed under the Act at sentencing; however, the sentencing judges found the Act
unconstitutional and imposed lesser sentences than those required by the statute. McMillan,
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McMillan was delivered in the midst of a complex and everchanging due process analysis and represented the Supreme Court’s
broader effort to limit the scope of its decisions in In re Winship and
Mullaney v. Wilbur 115 and, consequently, the applicability of the due
process clause to the criminal law. 116 In In re Winship, the Supreme
Court decided that the due process clause required “proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which [the defendant] is charged” 117 in an adjudication to determine
juvenile delinquency. 118 In Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court
concluded that the reasonable doubt standard applied to all factors that,
if present, could affect the defendant’s interests in liberty and
reputation. 119 However, the Supreme Court subsequently decided in
Patterson v. New York 120 to limit the rule of In re Winship only to those
factors defined by statute as elements of a crime. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a plurality of the Court in McMillan, stated that its holding
was “controlled by Patterson . . . rather than by Mullaney” 121 and
justified increasing severity in punishment through a “convenient yet
dangerous fiction . . . of the punishment-enhancement distinction.” 122
Fourth, after the Guidelines came into force, the Supreme Court
re-affirmed the principles of Williams in United States v. Watts and
rejected a double jeopardy challenge 123 against the use of acquitted
conduct at sentencing. 124 In order to overcome any constitutional
477 U.S. at 82. The cases were appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which
consolidated the Commonwealth’s appeals, and rejected the appellees contentions and found
that the Act was consistent with In re Winship, Mullaney and Patterson insofar as it did not
create a presumption with respect to any fact constituting an element of the crimes in
question. Id. at 83. The court then vacated the appellees’ sentences and remanded for
sentencing pursuant to the Act. Id. at 83–86. The United States Supreme Court granted a
writ of certiorari and affirmed the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Id. at 93.
For a detailed discussion, see Anthony J. Dennis, Fifth Amendment-Due Process Rights at
Sentencing, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 646 (1986).
115. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
116. Dennis, supra note 114, at 646–53.
117. In re Winship, 379 U.S. 358, 364.
118. Dennis, supra note 114, at 652.
119. Id. at 651.
120. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
121. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86.
122. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Double Jeopardy, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and
the Subsequent-Prosecution Dilemma, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 725, 726 (1994); Bilsborrow,
supra note 3, at 289, 308. See also Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013)
(citing United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010)) (“The touchstone for determining
whether a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact
constitutes an ‘element’ or ‘ingredient’ of the charged offense.”).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
124. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151, 157 (1997). See also Berman, supra note
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objections and to preserve the historic role of sentencing judges as
experts, the Court simply sought validation in pre-Guideline
precedent. 125 The Court first turned to the language of 18 U.S.C. §
3661, which prohibited any limitation on the types of evidence a
sentencing judge may hear, thus, confirming that the wide discretion
inherent in the statute survived the enactment of the Guidelines. 126
Next, the Court relied on its decision in Witte v. United States, 127 which
itself had relied on the pre-Guideline era case of Williams. In Witte,
the Court had held that “consideration of information about the
defendant’s character and conduct at sentencing does not result in
‘punishment’ for any offense other than the one of which the defendant
was convicted.” 128 Thus, the Court’s decision in Watts confirmed that
the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing had survived the enactment
of the Guidelines. 129 However, while judges in the indeterminate
sentencing era occasionally considered acquitted conduct, with its
indeterminate consequences, under the Guidelines, it was mandatory,
with determinate consequences. 130
2. Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence Post-Booker
A mere three years after Watts, the Court’s Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence took a new turn, which was fundamentally at odds with
both Watts and its prior sentencing decisions. 131 However, given the
complex and highly debated shift in the Court’s Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, only a brief sketch is provided below to show that the
use of acquitted conduct sentencing persists. 132
69, at 17–23 (discussing cases prior Watts and noting that the Supreme Court failed to
respond to the changes ushered in by the Guidelines); Sterback, supra note 2, at 1232–33
(discussing the background and justification of the Watts decision).
125. See Sterback, supra note 2, at 1225–31.
126. Id. at 1231–32.
127. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 408 (1995).
128. Id. at 401.
129. Watts, 519 U.S. at 151–52.
130. See Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 308–09 & n. 147; Gertner, supra note 61, at 702.
131. Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 308–09.
132. Many sources have discussed Booker and its progeny. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman,
III, Nothing is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal Sentencing System, 24
FED. SENT’G REP. 356 (2012), Bilsborrow, supra note 3; Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate
Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 717 (2009);
Casey McTigue, The Impact of Post-Cunningham Judicial Review: The Impact of Gall,
Kimbrough and Senate Bill 40 on California Sentencing, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 199
(2008); Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631 (2012);
Amy Baron-Evans, The Continuing Struggle for Just, Effective and Constitutional
Sentencing After United States v. Booker 1–6, 18–24 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available
at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and
_policy/files/struggle_for_constitutional_sentencing_after_booker.rev.8.16.06.doc.
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The Supreme Court’s line of cases beginning with Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 133 Harris v. United States, 134 Blakely v. Washington 135 and
United States v. Booker, 136 dramatically altered the sentencing
landscape. 137 Under these cases, any sentencing fact that has the effect
of increasing the statutory maximum punishment, 138 beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum for an offense, 139 but not any applicable
mandatory minimum sentence, 140 must be found by a jury beyond a
Some
reasonable doubt unless admitted by the defendant. 141
commentators proclaimed that these cases were evidence of how “the
Court got its Sixth Amendment groove back” and concluded that the
Court had finally “beg[un] to push back, crafting what would
eventually become a powerful new Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.” 142
However, such claims proved to be premature. For example, while
the Booker court found constitutional fault with a regime that
excessively delegated determinate fact-finding decisions to the judge at
the expense of the jury, 143 the majority splintered in deciding a proper
remedy. 144 Rather than requiring Congress to completely overhaul the
Guidelines, the Booker court’s remedial opinion simply excised the
language from the SRA, which required mandatory application of the
Guidelines, rendering the Guidelines merely advisory. 145
Consequently, the real-offense components of the Guidelines, which
permit consideration of relevant conduct, including acquitted conduct,
remain highly influential, since judges are still required to initially
calculate the Guidelines range as they had done so before and
“consider” the resulting range before deciding whether to “depart”
from the Guidelines or impose a non-Guideline sentence. 146
133. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Court’s ruling in Apprendi was
foreshadowed the year before in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
134. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
135. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
136. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
137. See Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 309–10.
138. Id. at 310.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 309–15
142. Id. at 309.
143. Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 313.
144. See Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 18–24 (criticizing the Court’s two majority
opinions as inconsistent since the Court remedied the problem of mandatory judicial fact
finding with even more judicial fact finding).
145. Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 313 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245
(2005)).
146. Id. (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–60).
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II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING THE SRA
Building on the Part I’s discussion of the legal framework
governing the Guidelines and consideration of acquitted conduct under
its relevant conduct provisions, Part II.A focuses on the various
rationales of punishment listed in the SRA to determine whether there
is a primary rationale or dominant philosophy of punishment. It will be
argued that there is no explicit guidance in the SRA on what weight to
give the various rationales or theories of punishment reflected in the
“factors to be considered for sentencing” in the SRA. 147 This
discussion is set out as the basis for Part II.B and Part II.C’s
examination of the conceptual tension between the two overarching
theories of punishment in the SRA—retributivism and utilitarianism. 148
Part II.B considers whether retributive theories can justify punishment
of acquitted conduct. Part II.C determines whether the utilitarian and
consequentialist theories can justify punishment of acquitted conduct.
While offering a full defense of either retributive theories or utilitarian
theories of punishment is outside the scope of this Article, Part II.D
will argue that neither retributive nor utilitarian theories of punishment
provide a firm, coherent or stable foundation for considering acquitted
conduct at sentencing.
A. Does the SRA Specify a Primary Rationale or Philosophy?
While the drafters and text of the SRA expressed a fundamental
concern with principled sentencing, 149 the SRA did not, as a statutory
matter, adopt a particular punishment philosophy. 150 Consequently,
various commentators and the lower courts have struggled to apply a
consistent philosophy of punishment and reached conflicting
conclusions. 151 The conceptual and procedural struggles of the federal
sentencing system have been criticized as a “conceptual antimovement” 152 because they were motivated less by an express pursuit
of a new sentencing theory and more a rejection of the rehabilitative
ideal to eliminate sentencing disparities that resulted from discretionary

147. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (listing “factors to be considered”).
148. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at
Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 87 (2011).
149. Berman, supra note 69, at 11 & n.54 (citing Daniel J. Freed & Marc Miller, Taking
Purposes Seriously: The Neglected Requirement of Guideline Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT’G
REP. 295, 295 (1991) (noting Congress made one principle clear: the “purposes of
sentencing” listed in § 3553 were to play a central role)).
150. Id. at 11.
151. Id. at 11–12.
152. Id. at 11.
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sentencing practices. 153
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists all of the traditional justifications of
punishment and invites inconsistency, 154 by requiring judges to
consider a variety of different purposes and then, presumably, to give
priority to one. 155 As noted by Professor Andrew Ashworth, this “pickand-mix” approach appears to have some political popularity as similar
methods are now followed in England and Wales, Canada, New
Zealand and Australia, “despite the low value that it assigns to the rule
of law.” 156
As noted by Professor Michael Tonry, whether a sentencing
system or practice can be said to work depends on “what it is supposed
to do, and how well it does that.” 157 Examination of the purposes of
punishment refers to the “normative rationales such as retribution or
crime prevention through deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and
moral education.” 158 “Normative purposes provide the ultimate criteria
by which the justness of a punishment system is assessed.” 159
According to Kenneth R. Feinberg, 160 Congress was ambivalent about
clearly defining the role and priority of sentencing purposes and thus
largely “fudged the issue in drafting” the SRA. 161 Scholars such as
Andrew von Hirsch, 162 Aaron J. Rappaport 163 and Paul H. Robinson 164
have questioned whether the sentencing guidelines provide any
principled guidance about the purpose of punishment. 165
Ultimately, Stephen Breyer, who worked on the original
Commission and now serves as Associate U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
153. Id.
154. Id. at 11–12; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
155. See ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 77.
156. Id at 77–78.
157. Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6
(2006).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 13.
160. Kenneth Feinberg is an attorney in Washington, formerly Special Counsel to the
Senate Judiciary Committee and Consultant to the United States Sentencing Commission.
He is a primary author of the federal legislation creating the United States Sentencing
Commission.
161. Berman, supra note 69, at 12 n.57 (citing Kenneth R. Feingberg, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Underlying Purposes of Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT’G REP.
326, 326 (1991)).
162. Andrew von Hirsch, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Do They Provide Principled
Guidance?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 367 (1989).
163. Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s
Troubling Silence About the Purposes of Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043 (2003).
164. Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1987).
165. See Berman, supra note 69, at 12.
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confirmed that while the Sentencing Commission initially considered
adopting a primary rationale or specific purpose of punishment, it
eventually chose not to do so. 166 More recent studies, such as Paul J.
Hofer and Mark H. Allenbaugh’s study, 167concluded that the
philosophy underlying the Guidelines is one of “modified just
deserts,” 168 a form of Norval Morris’ 169 “limiting retributivism.” 170
This approach places “primary emphasis on punishment proportionate
to the seriousness of the crime and, within the broad parameters of this
retributivism, lengthier incarceration for offenders who are most likely
to recidivate.” 171 However, while limiting retributivism as a rationale
for punishment simply sets upper “deserved” or “undeserved” limits, it
does not necessarily satisfy the demands of distributive justice or
provide a workable structure. In other words, limiting retributivism
does not say much about the Guideline as “most penal codes are . . .
constructed on lines consistent with limiting retributivism, providing
maximum sentences which set the upper limit to severity without
obliging the court to impose the maximum” 172 and is more properly
characterized as a limiting principle rather than a rationale.173
Next, Rappaport’s 174 rational reconstruction of the Guidelines
suggested that the underlying philosophy was a utilitarian theory of
punishment. 175 However, since the Supreme Court’s Booker decision,
there is a growing appreciation and consensus on the fragmented and
muddled nature of sentencing policy in the United States. 176 Berman
has argued that the SRA was focused more on a rejection of “the old
166. Id. (citing Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15–18 (1988)).
167. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and
Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19
(2003).
168. Id. at 51–52.
169. Professor Norval Morris was Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, a
criminologist, and a vocal advocate of criminal justice and mental health reform. Morris’s
theory of “limiting retributivism” supports a retributivist system of punishment, but with
attempts to appeal to certain utilitarian concerns. For a detailed discussion, see Matthew
Haist, Deterrence in a Sea of “Just Deserts”: Are Utilitarian Goals Achievable In A World
of “Limiting Retributivism”?, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789, 792 (2009) and Richard
S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME AND JUST. 363 (1997).
170. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 91, at 14 (citations omitted).
171. Id.
172. CHARLES K.B. BARTON, GETTING EVEN: REVENGE AS A FORM OF JUSTICE 46
(1999) (citations omitted).
173. See id.; Haist, supra note 169, at 802–03.
174. Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557 (2003).
175. Id. at 561.
176. Tonry, supra note 157, at 1–2.
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conceptual sentencing model” 177 than developing a new one. 178 In the
same vein, Tonry has suggested that “[t]here is no overriding theory or
model . . . . [N]o widely shared understandings about what sentencing
can or should accomplish or about [the] conceptions of justice it should
incorporate or reflect.” 179 Drawing on this continuing academic
debate, the Commission’s own statements, and the Supreme Court’s
post-Booker sentencing jurisprudence, the conclusive conceptual
philosophy of the SRA appears to be that there would be no conceptual
philosophy. 180
B. Does Retributivism in the SRA Justify Acquitted Conduct
Sentencing?
At the top of the list of the § 3553(a)(2) factors is retribution: “the
need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment.” 181 Retributivism is often understood as “backward
looking, focusing primarily on primarily on the criminal and the crime
committed,” 182 as opposed to deterrence, discussed infra, “which looks
forward to the future gains that flow from punishment (while
neglecting the actual crime committed).” 183 However, retributivism is
not only one theory, but rather several theories. 184 For retributivists,
“[i]n terms of the three main issues in the justifications of
punishment—Why punish? Whom to punish? How much to
punish?—desert theorists agree in principle about the second and
third.” 185
As to the first question, Legal Philosopher and Professor H.L.
Hart has suggested that “deterrence is why we punish, but retributivism
governs how and whom we punish” 186 or cast in Kantian terms “[a
retributive system of punishment would be] ‘deterrence in its threat,
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Berman, supra note 69, at 15.
Id.
Tonry, supra note 157, at 1.
See Berman, supra note 69, at 15.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012).
Mark D. White, Retributivism in a World of Scarcity, in
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 254 (Mark D. White ed., 2009).
183. Id. (citations omitted).
184. For concise summaries of retributivism and deterrence, see Anthony Duff, Legal
Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (May 13, 2013), http://
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment.
185. Desert, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra
note 29, at 102.
186. WHITE, supra note 182, at 256 (citing H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1968)).
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retribution in its execution.’” 187 As noted by Mark D. White,188 this
hybrid theory amounts to the standard deterrence approach limited by
negative retributivism, which prohibits intentional punishment of the
innocent, as well as disproportionate penalties. 189 However, the
fundamental premise of this hybrid theory has been criticized since the
“ethical foundations of deterrence and retributivism are mutually
exclusive, and any combination thereof will compromise them both.” 190
Michael Moore 191 argues that those who commit crimes deserve to be
punished for the same reason as those who commit civil wrongs. 192
More recently, Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth’s 193
answer to this question centers on the communicative force of
punishment as a justification for the imposition of punishment. 194
Desert theory is a modern form of retributive philosophy and, like
retributivism, comes in various forms. 195 Just desert theory, as
developed by von Hirsh and Ashworth 196 has two intertwined
justifications. 197 Desert is “an integral part of everyday judgments and
blame” 198 and state punishment institutionalizes this censuring
function. 199 Thus, sentences communicate official censure or blame: 200
punishments are different from taxes or quarantines because of their
special communicative function 201 to the offender, the victim and
society. 202 To this normative reason, this model adds a prudential or

187. Id. (citing B. Sharon Byrd, Kant’s Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat,
Retribution in Its Execution, 8 LAW & PHIL. 151–200 (1989)).
188. See, e.g., id. at 257; Mark D. White, A Kantian Critique of Neoclassical Law &
Economics, 18 REV. POL. ECON. 235–52 (2004).
189. WHITE, supra note 182, at 257.
190. Id. (citing JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A
REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 166–68 (1990) and Alan H. Goldman, The
Paradox of Punishment, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 42, 42–58 (1979)).
191. See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PLACING BLAME: A
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (2010). Michael S. Moore, University of Illinois, College of
Law Charles R. Walgreen, Jr. Chair, Co-Director, Program in Law and Philosophy.
192. WHITE, supra note 182, at 256.
193. See generally Malcolm Thorburn & Allan Manson, The Sentencing Theory Debate:
Convergence in Outcomes, Divergence in Reasoning, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 278 (2007)
(discussing ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING:
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES (2005)).
194. See id. at 281.
195. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 88.
196. Id. at 88 n. 90.
197. Id. at 88.
198. Id. (citations omitted).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Thorburn & Manson, supra note 193, at 282–83.
202. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 88.
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consequentialist rationale: 203 hard treatment. 204 This preventative
element is designed to add incentive to obey the law and act as
This preventative or consequentialist element is
deterrence. 205
characterized by Ashworth as a “contingent foundation” 206 for the
sentencing system, subject to the requirements that it be “imposed only
on those who have actually done wrong and only in proportion to their
wrong.” 207 Proportionality, in its two senses, is the touchstone of the
punishment rationale underlying just desert theory: ordinal
proportionality concerns the relative seriousness of the offense; and
cardinal proportionality relates the original ranking to a scale of
punishments, and requires that the penalty should not be out of
proportion to the gravity of the crime involved. 208 Von Hirsch suggests
that sentencing policy makers can rank the seriousness of various
crimes ordinally, that is, relative to each other, but that the cardinal or
absolute severity of the scale of punishment required by just desert is
indeterminable. 209
However, retribution has been criticized since it equates criminal
wrongdoing with morality even though not all crimes are immoral, and
not all moral failings are typically punished. 210 Thus, retributive justice
may treat innocent and guilty parties alike, despite the fact that one
party lacks culpability. 211 Additionally, retributive sentencing lacks
uniformity allowing an innocent party to receive a harsher penalty than
However, eliminating
a similarly situated innocent party. 212
punishment would have the same distorting effect on the comparative
account of desert. 213 In other words, the guilty person is treated equally
with the innocent even though, on a comparative basis, he deserves to
be treated worse. 214 Drawing from Moore’s discussion of coherence
theories of justification in ethics, 215 moral desert can be justified in
comparison to utilitarian theories of punishment, “by showing that it
203. Id. at 89.
204. Thorburn & Manson, supra note 193, at 283.
205. Id.
206. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 89.
207. Thorburn & Manson, supra note 193, at 283.
208. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 89.
209. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME &
JUST. 55 (1992).
210. See White, supra note 188.
211. See id.
212. Larry Alexander, Retributivism and the Inadvertent Punishment of the Innocent, 2
L. & PHIL. 233, 238 (1983)
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING:
READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra note 29, at 111.
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best accounts for those of our more particular judgments that we also
believe to be true.” 216 Retribution best accounts for our “more
particular judgments” by absolutely forbidding the punishment of the
innocent; utilitarian theories of punishment “may sometimes require
the punishment of an innocent person or the excessive punishment of
an offender” to achieve fear of punishment in other persons. 217
Further, as illustrated by Professor Ronald Dworkin’s example, a
mistaken conviction involves a moral harm (an undeserved stigma), in
addition to bare harm (loss of liberty), and, thus, it is morally worse
than the equivalent bare harm (loss of liberty) suffered at the hands of
an un-deterred criminal. 218
Retributivist theories rely on the fundamental proposition that
punishment should only be “imposed only on those who have . . . [been
convicted] . . . and only in proportion to their wrong.” 219 This
limitation implicates “Hart’s famous distinction between the general
justifying aims of a system of punishment and the principles of
distribution that operate within such a system.” 220 Ashworth and von
Hirsch argue that “[o]nce the state has undertaken to institute a system
of punishment . . . the distribution of punishment is subject to the
demands of distributive justice, and the appropriate criterion for
distribution is individual desert.” 221 For example, Henry Lombard, Jr.
was charged with two counts of murder in Superior Court in the State
of Maine. 222 After a week and half long trial, the state jury acquitted
Mr. Lombard on both counts. 223 However, just a year after his
acquittal on state charges of murder, a federal jury convicted him of
one count of illegal possession of a firearm. 224 Since the firearm was
the alleged murder weapon in the earlier state case, the federal judge
was able to consider the murders for which Lombard was acquitted and
using the relevant conduct provision of the Guidelines apply the base
offense level for murder. 225 The sentencing judge imposed a sentence
of life imprisonment on Lombard, the statutory maximum on the
216. Id.
217. Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY,
supra note 29, at 42.
218. Alexander, supra note 212, at 238.
219. Thorburn & Manson, supra note 193, at 283.
220. Id. (citing H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (2d ed. 2008)).
221. Id.
222. United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 1995). See also Ngov, supra note
1, at 236–39 (summarizing facts of Lombard case).
223. Lombard, 72 F.3d at 173.
224. Id. at 173.
225. Id. at 172.
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firearm charge. 226
The use of acquitted conduct to impose a de facto sentence for
murder on Lombard, without conviction for murder, cannot be justified
by retributivist theories of punishment since retributivists do not
support the notion of sentencing on character. Thus, the use of
acquitted conduct fatally undermines the foundational premise of
retributivist theories of punishment and the state’s justification of ‘why
we punish.’ 227
C. Utilitarian or Mixed Theories of Punishment
Proponents of forward-looking utilitarian theories of punishment,
such as deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation, 228 typically view
both offense conduct and offender characteristics as central
considerations when seeking to predict and prevent future criminal
behavior. 229 The aims of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation
all support punishment relative to its crime-preventative consequences,
which are advanced within a utilitarian framework. 230 Under this
framework, the justification for punishment and the measure of
punishment are found in a “calculation of its utility compared with the
attendant disutilities.” 231
Deterrence—specific and general—“is one of a number of
consequentialist aims which share the goal of preventing crime.” 232 It
has a consequentialist rationale in the sense that it looks to the
preventative consequences of sentences. 233 Under deterrence theory,
three factors affect a sanction’s deterrent value: severity, certainty and
celerity. 234 A sentencing system based on special deterrence would
need to ensure that courts have detailed information on the character,
circumstances and previous record of a particular offender, and would
then require courts to calculate the sentence necessary to induce the
226. Id. at 179.
227. See Richard S. Frase, Prior-Conviction Sentencing Enhancement: Rationales and
Limits Based on Retributive and Utilitarian Proportionality Principles and Social Equality
Goals, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED
PERSPECTIVE 122 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsh eds., 2010).
228. Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY,
supra note 29, at 39; Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender
Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 289 (2005).
229. Berman, supra note 228, at 289.
230. Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY,
supra note 29, at 39.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 78.
234. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 167, at 61.
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particular offender to comply. 235 However, punishments might have to
be increased substantially for persistent offenders, at the risk of the
parsimony principle, 236 and at the risk of unwarranted sentencing
disparities between similarly situated offenders since each sentence
would be specially calculated so as to influence the specific offender
before the court. 237
The objection to general deterrence theories have often been
expressed in the Kantian maxim, “a person should always be treated as
an end in himself [or herself], and never only as a means.” 238 Since
general deterrence theory’s distinctive aim and method is to create fear
of punishment in other persons, it may sometimes require the
punishment of an innocent person or the excessive punishment of an
offender in order to achieve this “greater social effect.” 239 This
approach regards citizens merely as numbers to be aggregated in an
overall social calculation and shows no respect for the moral worth and
autonomy of each individual. Furthermore, citizens should not be used
merely as a means to an end. 240 While punishment is a means to an
end, punishment of any given individual cannot and should not be
justified solely by reference to wider social benefits. 241
Although deterrence is plainly listed as a factor in § 3553(a) 242 the
Commission has held that deterrence is not the primary rationale of the
Guideline. 243 Both specific and general deterrence figures prominently
as a goal in the SRA; however, their utility in drafting specific
guideline provisions and ranges is dependent upon empirical data
regarding “the likelihood of detection, prosecution, and conviction” for
a particular type of crime. 244 This is so that severity levels can be
adjusted. 245 Research on deterrence has not yielded any findings to
inform the design of specific guideline provisions, leading most
academic research to agree that deterrence cannot be the Guideline’s
primary rationale. 246
235. Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY,
supra note 29, at 41–42.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 78.
239. Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY,
supra note 29, at 41–42 (citations omitted).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (2012).
243. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 167, at 61.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 61–62.

YALINCAK FINAL

702

8/21/2014 4:07 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

Incapacitation is, in essence, a way to deal with offenders in such
a way as to “make them incapable of offending for substantial periods
of time.” 247 The SRA presents incapacitation in terms that Ashworth
has framed in its “popular form of public protection.” 248 The
significant concern with incapacitation is displayed in the Guidelines
and related commentary where it directs the Commission’s attention to
offender’s’ “criminal history . . . and . . . degree of dependence upon
criminal activity for a livelihood,”249 and it mandates sentences “near
the maximum term authorized” for repeat drug and violent offenders 250
and a “substantial term of imprisonment” for certain other categories of
repeat and high-risk offenders. 251
In his rational reconstruction approach to the Guidelines,
Rappaport argued “utilitarianism, offers the best reconstruction of the
four critical guideline provisions under analysis;” 252 however, he fails
to overcome both empirical and principled objections. 253 Richard
Singer, a strict desert theorist, has argued that predictions should have
no place in sentencing and that sentences should be based solely on the
seriousness of the current offense. 254 Andrew von Hirsch has argued
that sentences for first time offenders and increasing relative sentences
for repeat offenders can be justified within the strictures of the desert
theory by the increased culpability of someone who re-offends after
having already been warned and punished. 255 For strict utilitarians,
preventative detention can be justified if the harm prevented through
incarceration is greater than the harm of incarceration itself. 256
Incapacitation has drawn empirical criticism for drawing into its net
more ‘non-dangerous’ than ‘dangerous’ offenders, with a high rate of
false positives. 257 The principled objections parallel the objection to
deterrent sentencing: “individuals are being punished, over and above
what they deserve, in the hope of protecting future victims from

247. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 84.
248. Id.
249. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 167, at 57 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(11) (2002)).
250. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)).
251. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(i)).
252. Rappaport, supra note 174, at 642. See Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 167, at
61–62.
253. See Rappaport, supra note 174; Berman, supra note 69.
254. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 167, at 57 (citing RICHARD SINGER, JUST
DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY & DESERT (1979)).
255. Id. (citing ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 77–78, 131–32 (1986)).
256. Id. (citation omitted).
257. ASHWORTH, supra note 19, at 84.
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harm.” 258 However, while hypothetical examples involving high-risk
offenders are appealing, at present there is no empirical data to
“sacrific[e] one offender’s liberty in the hope of increasing the future
safety of others.” 259
The rehabilitative rationale seeks to justify compulsory measures
as a means of achieving the prevention of crime, through rehabilitation
of the offender. 260 However, in the context of the SRA, while the SRA
requires that the Guidelines accommodate the statutory purposes of
rehabilitation, its role is limited, as Congress has specifically stated that
“imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction
and rehabilitation.” 261
D. Do Either Retributive or Utilitarian Theories Justify the Use of
Acquitted Conduct?
Recalling that acquitted conduct was permitted during the
indeterminate sentencing era when the rehabilitative ideal prevailed,
utilitarian theories of punishment—deterrence, incapacitation and, to a
lesser degree, rehabilitation—continue to, at least in part, underpin its
use today. As noted in Part I.E supra, courts have gotten around the
possibility that they may inadvertently punish innocent offenders by recharacterizing elements of a separate (uncharged or acquitted) criminal
offence as sentencing factors, 262 without regard to their identical impact
on the defendant: increased punishment. Whatever the merits of this
semantic flip-flop in the Court’s jurisprudence, the gravitational pull of
acquitted conduct sentencing invariably increases the possible sentence
and, necessarily, the risk of punishment of innocent individuals. 263
While a jury verdict of “not guilty” does not necessarily always equate
to “innocent,” 264 this reliance upon ‘facts’ often leads to “moral
slippage in that the so-called facts often become the moral qualities
relied upon by the retributionist.” 265 Next, the failure of utilitarian
approaches to encompass the notion of desert leads to difficulties in
258. Id. at 85.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 86.
261. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (describing duties of
the commission).
262. See discussion supra Part I.E.
263. See Ngov, supra note 1; Bilsborrow, supra note 3; Semones, supra note 11;
Gertner, supra note 61.
264. Mark T. Doerr, Not Guilty? Go to Jail. The Unconstitutionality of AcquittedConduct Sentencing, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 243, 261–62 (2009) (citations
omitted).
265. ROMAN TOMASIC & IAN DOBINSON, THE FAILURE OF IMPRISONMENT: AN
AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE 18 (1979).
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accounting for the concept of individual responsibility. 266 Recalling
the Kantian injunction above, the use of acquitted conduct also fails to
satisfy the Hartian command that “a theory of punishment should
include a link with both the general social justification for the
institution of punishment and the principles of distribution which
restrict its imposition to properly convicted offenders and which place
limits on the amount of punishment.” 267
Like retributivism, utilitarianism and its related theories are not
well suited to provide a coherent and consistent foundation for
acquitted conduct sentencing. This is because utilitarianism is not
limited to criminal law.268 Utilitarians seek to maximize social welfare
and permit deviations only if doing so maximizes social welfare. 269
Because they are guaranteed by the Constitution, the right to due
process, and the right to a jury trial must rest on utilitarian grounds
since they are meant to maximize social welfare. 270 Accordingly,
permitting the use of acquitted conduct through the relevant conduct
provisions of the Guidelines real offense sentencing system does not
reflect the purposes and significance of the these fundamental rights.
Further, even if such rights have no utilitarian grounds, these rights
should trump utilitarian values. 271 This is not to say that rights should
always trump utilitarian values—constitutional rights must yield when
the societal costs of absolute enforcement would be too high—as
Justice Jackson stated, the Constitution is not a “suicide pact.” 272
Consequently, while the drafters and text of the SRA expressed a
266. Id.
267. Deterrence, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY,
supra note 29, at 43.
268. Hessick & Hessisk, supra note 148, at 88.
269. Id.
270. Id at 88–89.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 90 (citing Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1949) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) and RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 41 (2006)). Justice Jackson’s dissent in Terminiello is
most famous for its final paragraph:
This Court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine that civil liberty
means the removal of all restraints from these crowds and that all local
attempts to maintain order are impairments of the liberty of the citizen.
The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with
order and anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the Court does
not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will
convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 37. See also Patricia R. Stembridge, Adjusting Absolutism: First
Amendment Protections for the Fringe, 80 B.U. L. REV. 907, 915 (2000) (noting that even
Justice Black, who took an absolutist stance in interpreting the First Amendment, refused to
extend First Amendment protections to all speech).
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fundamental concern with principled sentencing, by omitting a primary
rationale or cohesive purpose of punishment, they undermined the
normative justifications and purposes of punishment by the state.
While at the time the SRA was enacted this was a defensible approach
since the Guidelines were mandatory and judges had very little
discretion to sentence outside the Guidelines, 273 since the Guidelines
have been rendered advisory by the Supreme Court’s Booker
decision, 274 the unprincipled nature of sentencing practice has been
thrown into sharp relief. The lack of direction is a “cafeteria system”
of sentencing, 275 a “prescription for sentencing anarchy,” 276 and
“licence to judges to pursue their own penal philosophies.” 277 Yet,
even if the SRA had specified a primary rationale or specific purpose
of punishment, as shown above, the use of any form of acquitted
conduct under the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines cannot
be justified by either retributive or utilitarian theories of punishment
without undermining the very purposes and justifications of
punishment by the state.
III. PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACQUITTED
CONDUCT SENTENCING
The practical consequence of using acquitted conduct under the
relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines are significantly longer
prison sentences with a disproportionate impact on the prison terms of
minorities. The increased prison terms have ranged from a number of

273. Berman, supra note 69, at 11–12.
274. Since Booker, the Supreme Court in a series of cases has re-affirmed that the
Guidelines are now “truly advisory” and that the touchstone of sentencing are the “factors to
be considered in imposing a sentence” listed in § 3553(a). For discussion of post-Booker
developments see Gertner, supra note 61, at 704–07 (providing an in-depth discussion of
post-Booker case law); Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 314–15 (citing statistics which reveal
that post-Booker, approximately 85.9% of offenders receive sentences adhering to the
Guideline range compared with 90.6% prior to Booker) (citations omitted); Peter Erlinder,
“Doing Time” . . . After the Jury Acquits: Resolving the Post-Booker “Acquitted Conduct”
Sentencing Dilemma, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 79 (2008); David C. Hollman, Death
By A Thousand Cases: After Booker, Rita and Gall, The Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth
Amendment, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267 (2008); Anne E. Zygadlo, Circuit Circus: What
Is the Correct Standard of Review Applicable to Supervised Release Appeals After United
States v. Booker?, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 311 (2011); D. Michael Fisher, Still in Balance?
Federal District Court Discretion and Appellate Review Six Years After Booker, 49 DUQ. L.
REV. 641 (2011); Nicholas A. Deuschle, Fun With Numbers: Gall’s Mixed Message
Regarding Variance Calculations, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309 (2013).
275. ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 331 (2d ed. 1995).
276. Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Justice and Deserved Sentences, CRIM. L. REV. 340,
350 (1989).
277. ASHWORTH, supra note 275, at 63.
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months to life imprisonment based solely on acquitted conduct. When
the practical considerations are considered along with the constitutional
and normative concerns, it becomes clear that acquitted conduct
sentencing and the relevant conduct provisions of the guidelines
“undermines the importance of the substantive criminal law, nullifies
the law of evidence, and is irreconcilable with the notion that
punishment can be imposed only in respect of offenses admitted or
Nevertheless, acquitted conduct sentencing remains
proven.” 278
entirely permissible and is, in fact, required in the first step of
sentencing under the now advisory sentencing guidelines. 279 Judges
must still initially calculate the applicable sentencing guideline range
for defendants, taking into account any uncharged, acquitted, and/or
unrelated conduct, which may affect a particular defendant’s
sentencing range, before deciding to depart from the applicable
sentencing guideline range or impose a non-guideline sentence. 280 But,
how could this practice have survived the Blakely-Apprendi line of
cases? The Supreme Court’s Blakely opinion made it clear that the
Sixth Amendment right to jury-found facts was not necessarily limited
to the imposition of sentences above the statutory maximum. 281
Writing for the majority in Blakely, Justice Scalia made it clear that
both Apprendi and Blakely were based upon much more fundamental
considerations than properly allocating factual decision-making in
sentencing and were constitutionally grounded in the abstract question
of: 282
the need to give intelligible content to the right of a jury trial. That
right is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental
reservation of power in our constitutional structure. Just as
suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and
executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the
278. Tonry, supra note 45, at 1564.
279. See GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEPARTURE AND VARIANCE
PRIMER
1–2
(June
2013),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/
Legal/Primers/Primer_Departure_and_Variance.pdf (noting that after Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38 (2007), the sentencing court must follow a three-step process by “properly
determin[ing] the guideline range . . . Determin[ing] whether to apply any of the guidelines’
departure policy statements to adjust the guideline range . . . [Finally,] consider[ing] all the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553(a) as a whole, including whether a variance—a
sentence outside the advisory guideline system—is warranted.”) (citations omitted).
280. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[A] district court should
begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable guideline range . . .
[T]o secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the
initial benchmark”). See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)–(c)
(2012) (listing appropriate application instructions).
281. Erlinder, supra note 274, at 93.
282. Id.
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judiciary . . . . Apprendi carries out this design by ensuring that the
judge’s authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury’s
verdict. Without that restriction, the jury would not exercise the
283
control that the Framer’s intended.

However, the Booker majority’s remedial opinion, in throwing out
mandatory guideline sentencing in favor of the “uniformity” achieved
by “real conduct” sentencing on the basis of PSRs prepared by
probation officers, paradoxically resulted in the Court “remedying” the
judicial fact-finding at issue in Apprendi and Blakely with judicial factfinding. 284
On one hand, the five justices in the majority in Blakely 285 and in
the constitutional majority in Booker 286 were deeply disturbed by the
guidelines requiring an equivalent of a conviction for “uncharged,
dismissed and acquitted crimes without the fundamental components
the adversary system the Framers intended, i.e., notice, jury trial, and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 287 These justices held that “real
conduct” sentencing and the related relevant conduct provisions of the
guidelines are an “assault” on the Sixth Amendment’s “fundamental
reservation of power” in the people within “our constitutional
structure.” 288 They noted that “[t]he jury could not function as circuit
breaker in the State’s machinery of justice if it were relegated to
making a determination that the defendant at some point did something
wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the

283. Id. (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004)).
284. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 20 (citing Michael W. McConnell, The Booker
Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665 (2006)); David J. D’Addio, Sentencing After Booker: The
Impact of Appellate Review on Defendants’ Rights, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (2006);
Frank O. Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing
After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 182; M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines After Blakely and Booker: The Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater
Role for Juries, 56 S.C. L. REV. 533, 564 (2005); United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp.
2d 282, 288–301 (D. Mass. 2006). See Bilsborrow, supra note 3.
285. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 21.
286. Id. at 21–22 (noting the distinction between the constitutional majority and the
remedial majority). In Booker, Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion answering the
question of whether the application of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment under
the Apprendi line of cases, while Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion answering the
question of how to remedy the Sixth Amendment violation identified by the Court. Id.
287. Id. at 21 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306–07) (noting that not even Apprendi’s
critics can support the “absurd result” of a man being sentenced “for committing murder,
even if the jury convicted him only of possessing the firearm used to commit it—or of
making an illegal lane change while fleeing the death scene” and noting that Blakely was
sentenced based on the “very charge” that was dismissed pursuant to his guilty plea). See
also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 273 (2005) (noting that Booker was sentenced
based on uncharged crimes).
288. Id. (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305–08, 313).
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crime the State actually seeks to punish.” 289
Perhaps, more
importantly, these justices noted that had the Sixth Amendment issue
been raised in Witte and Watts, they would have decided those cases
differently. 290 In short, these justices were aware that the “facts” of
uncharged, dismissed, and acquitted offenses are determined unfairly
and unreliably—without notice by indictment or plea, and based on
“hearsay-riddled presentence reports” prepared by probation officers
who the judge thinks “more likely got it right than got it wrong.” 291
On the other hand, Justice Breyer described as “stunningly
uninformed by actual practice” 292 by Amy Baron-Evans, 293 portrayed
“real conduct” sentencing as merely the “way in which” the offense
was committed based on “factual information . . . uncovered after trial”
contained in the “presentence report,” which is determined “fairly” by
probation officers. 294 Despite Justice Breyer’s fanciful view of
sentencing in practice, Justice Ginsburg inexplicably signed on to this
description in the Booker remedy opinion. 295 However, Justice
Breyer’s utopian description of the real conduct sentencing provisions
is no more than “wishful policy theories that can easily be
discredited.” 296
Part III.A briefly highlights the racial disparities in sentencing
under the Guidelines’ real conduct and related relevant conduct
provisions and provides examples of cases where defendants have been
sentenced to substantially longer prison sentences. Part III.B explores
how the use of acquitted conduct sentencing undermines the
justifications for punishment and weakens the rule of law. Part III.C
discusses how the use of acquitted conduct and the relevant conduct
provisions of the Guidelines can cause disproportionate severity and
unwarranted uniformity in sentencing and undermine the substantive
criminal law. Part III.D focuses on the impact of acquitted conduct at
sentencing on the burden of proof and law of evidence. Part III.E
289. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306–07.
290. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 21. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 240.
291. Booker, 543 U.S. at 304. See also Ngov, supra note 1, at 239 (“Hearsay, double
hearsay, and even triple hearsay is permissible as long as there is an ‘indicia of
reliability.’ ” ) (citations omitted).
292. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 22.
293. Amy Baron-Evans serves as a Sentencing Resource Counsel for the Federal Public
and Community Defenders.
294. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 22; Booker, 543 U.S. at 250–57, 326–29.
295. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 22 (noting that in her dissent in Washington v.
Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 224 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), Justice Ginsburg noted that
her position on “real conduct” sentencing under a de facto mandatory guideline system had
not changed.)
296. Id.
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highlights how acquitted conduct sentencing undermines the role of the
jury. Finally, Part III.F comments on the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Alleyne v. United States. 297
A. Acquitted Conduct Sentencing Contributes to Longer Prison
Sentences and With a Disproportionate Impact on Racial and Ethnic
Minorities
The relevant conduct provisions of the sentencing guidelines,
which permit the use of acquitted conduct, results in unwarranted
sentencing disparity. In practice, the use of acquitted conduct at
sentencing under the broad relevant conduct provisions of the
Guidelines is not consistently applied because of “ambiguity in the
language of the rule, discomfort with the role of law enforcement in
establishing relevant conduct, and discomfort with the severity of
sentences that often result.” 298 Research by the Federal Judicial Center
showed that probation officers applying the relevant conduct rules
sentenced three defendants in widely divergent ranges, “ranging from
57 to 136 months for one defendant, 37 to 136 months for the second
defendant, and 24 to 136 months for the third defendant.” 299
Further, in federal prison, people of color and ethnic minorities
make up more than seventy-five percent of the prison population,
although they constitute only twenty-five percent of the U.S.
population. 300 Put another way, the federal rate of incarceration is 412
per 100,000 residents for whites, 742 per 100,000 residents for
Hispanics, and 2,290 per 100,000 residents for African-Americans
according to statistics from the Bureau of Justice in 2006 and 2008
U.S. Census. 301 How about the length of their sentences? 302 As noted
by U.S. District Judge Lynn Adelman and his law clerk Jon Dietrich,
the average sentence for an African-American offender is about
twenty-five percent longer than for a white offender. 303 Simply stated,
more black and ethnic minority defendants have acquitted conduct used

297. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013).
298. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 24 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note
91, at 87).
299. Id. at 25.
300. Carol A. Brook, Racial Disparity Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35
LITIG. 15, 15 (2008) (citing statistics from Bureau of Justice). See also RICHARD S. FRASE,
JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLE AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM xiv (2013)
(noting that punitive shifts and racial disparity will be recurring problems).
301. Brook, supra note 300, at 15.
302. Id.
303. Id. (citing Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Rita, District Court Discretion, and
Fairness in Federal Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 57 (2007)).

YALINCAK FINAL

710

8/21/2014 4:07 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

against them under the broad relevant conduct provisions of the
Guidelines than white defendants; as a result, acquitted conduct may be
used as an unintended proxy for racial disparagement. While
sentencing scholars disagree on the reasons for this disparity, 304 they do
agree on the impact of acquitted conduct sentencing under the relevant
conduct provisions of the Guidelines: longer prison terms for offenders.
By requiring longer prison terms, acquitted conduct sentencing also
heightens inherent racial disparities under the federal Guidelines.
For example, in 2007 Antwuan Ball, a 37-year-old AfricanAmerican resident of the District of Columbia was charged with
multiple drug offenses, racketeering, murder, conspiracy and dozens of
other charges. 305 The jury acquitted him on all charges except a single
$600 drug transaction. 306 This sole count of conviction corresponded
to an advisory Guideline range of approximately three years
imprisonment with a statutory maximum of forty years; 307 however, he
was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment based on the acquitted
conduct. 308
Similarly, in 2009 Gary Williams, an African-American resident
of the State of Maryland, was convicted on federal charges of cocaine
distribution and one count of distributing fifty grams or more of
cocaine base. 309 However, at sentencing the judge found Williams
responsible for the first-degree murder of an intended prosecution
witness. 310 Williams was neither charged with a murder nor was he
ever convicted of murder. 311 Nevertheless, Williams was sentenced to
life imprisonment on the drug conviction based on the relevant conduct
provisions of the Guidelines, which required cross-referencing the base
offense level for first-degree murder, which called for a life
sentence. 312 The sentence was affirmed on appeal because the statutory
maximum for the drug charges was life-imprisonment. 313

304. Id.
305. McElhatton, supra note 27 (detailing facts of case).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Jim McElhatton, D.C. Man Gets 18 Years for $600 Drug Deal, WASH. TIMES (Mar.
17, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/17/dc-man-get-18-years-in600-drug-deal/?page=all. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
ruling. United States v. Johnson, No. 08-3033, 2014 WL 982870, at *5–6 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
309. Leonard & Dieter, supra note 109, at 292 (citing United States v. Williams, 343
Fed. App’x 912–13 (4th Cir. 2009)).
310. Id. (citing Williams, 343 Fed. App’x at 913).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 292–93.
313. Id. at 293.
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B. Acquitted Conduct Sentencing Undermines the Justifications for
Punishment by the State
Given the historical and philosophical commitment to liberty of
the Anglo-American system of criminal law, the imposition of criminal
sanctions is justified only on individuals whose acts violate the
criminal law and who have admitted their unlawful acts or have been
convicted at trial on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 314
The criminal conviction standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”
as required by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause serves as a
foundational principle of American criminal justice—to protect against
factual error whenever a potential loss of liberty is at stake, regardless
of the identity of the fact-finder or whether the finding results in
“conviction” of a “crime” or is merely treated as a sentencing factor.
As explained by Justice Brennan: 315
There is always, in litigation, a margin of error, representing error
in fact-finding, which both parties must take into account. Where
one party has at stake an interest of transcending value—as a
criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of error is reduced as to
him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of . . .
316
convincing the fact-finder of his guilt.

Therefore, the jury determines “legal guilt . . . by the highest
standard of proof we know, beyond a reasonable doubt. And when a
jury acquit[s] a defendant based on that standard, one . . . [expects] no
additional criminal punishment would follow.” 317 Since under both a
retributive or utilitarian model of punishment the offender is only to be
punished after formal conviction, punishment of defendants on the
basis of acquitted conduct, no matter how convincing the evidence put
forth by the state (especially for conduct for which the jury returned a
verdict of “not guilty”), challenges the “historic link between verdict
and judgment” 318 that justifies the imposition of punishment by the
state in the first place. 319
The relevant conduct provisions in the sentencing guidelines
essentially facilitate conviction for bad character, which is not
permitted under either a retributive or utilitarian model of

314. Tonry, supra note 45, at 1564.
315. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 358–68 (1970).
316. Id. at 364 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)).
317. Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Justice: Lessons from Criminal Trials and
Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419, 433 (1999).
318. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482–83 (2000) (citation omitted).
319. See id.
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punishment. 320
More crucially, acquitted conduct sentencing
encourages convictions that may often be “based on facts that often are
not real at all.” 321 As observed by the Commission, “‘research [has]
suggested significant disparities in how [the relevant conduct] rules
were applied’, and ‘questions remain about how consistently it can be
applied’. . . [since] . . . ‘disputes must be resolved based on potentially
untrustworthy factors, such as the testimony of co-conspirators.’ ” 322
Moreover, “[m]ost probation officers incorporate the prosecutor’s
written version of events verbatim into the PSR.” 323 More troubling,
perhaps, is the fact that the mere inclusion of factual allegations in a
PSR in several circuits transforms them ipse dixit into “evidence,”
which “relieves the government of introducing actual evidence and
shifts the burden to the defendant to disprove it.” 324
Simply stated, this process results in “punishment for acts not
constitutionally proven.” 325 Rather, the system “relies on ‘findings’
that rest on ‘a mishmash of data[,] including blatantly self-serving
hearsay largely served up by the Department [of Justice].”326 Thus, the
Booker remedy “continues to provide safe harbor for the imaginative
fantasies of what really occurred under the rubric of real [relevant]
conduct.” 327
C. Subversion of the Substantive Criminal Law
The stakes at sentencing are high—deprivation of liberty and
property—and the courts and legislatures generally attempt to specify
the elements of offenses and defenses with tedious detail. 328 Why?
Conviction and the resulting public labeling, denunciation, and possible
320. Frase, supra note 227, at 122.
321. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 23.
322. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 91, at 50). See also David M.
Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial
Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 222 (2004) (“The resulting slew of petty,
small time dealers being charged in federal court particularly outraged some judges who felt
federal court should be reserved for weighty matters of national concern.”).
323. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 91, at 84, 86); Letter from Jon
M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, to Hon. Ricardo Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing
Commission
21
(July
19,
2006),
available
at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/defender_letter_to_ussc_71
906.pdf.
324. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 23–24, 24 n. 106 (citing to relevant cases).
325. Id at 24.
326. Id.
327. Id. (quoting Dan Markel, The Indispensable Berman on Booker, PRAWFSBLAWG
(June
26,
2006),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2006/06/the_indispensab.html).
328. Tonry, supra note 45, at 1565.
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deprivation of liberty are too important to tolerate ambiguities. 329 The
substantial burden of proof in criminal cases is a testament to the
importance of the interests and values implicated by the substantive
criminal law. 330 However, acquitted conduct sentencing under the
relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines is predicated on a
primary characterization of the criminal offense 331—an example of the
“tail wagging the dog.” 332 As observed by one commentator,
Nelson Guerrero served four years in prison for crimes of which he
was never convicted. Robert Mercado was sentenced to seventeen
years in prison for committing several violent crimes, even though
a jury had acquitted him of those crimes
...
One might think that [these] individuals . . . live in a totalitarian
regime without the protection of basic individual rights. But they
live (or have lived) in the United States, and their sentences were
handed down by American trial courts and subsequently affirmed
by appellate courts
...
American courts routinely increase sentences for reasons that seem
333
to conflict with constitutional protections . . . .

To sum it up, the offense admitted by the defendant, or which was
proven to a judge or jury’s satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, is
not a limiting factor in sentencing, but simply a starting point for
determining the base offense level in calculating the applicable
Guideline range. 334 As a consequence, the offense proven beyond a
reasonable doubt is a nullity; the modified real offense approach, which
incorporates relevant conduct and mandates consideration of acquitted
conduct, determines the end sentence. 335 As observed by Judge Oakes,
“[t]his is jurisprudence reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland. As the
Queen of Hearts might say, ‘Acquittal first, sentence afterwards.’ ” 336
D. Subversion of the Burden of Proof and Law of Evidence
As noted above in Part I.E, the Supreme Court in United States v.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Semones, supra note 11; Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog:
Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due
Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1992)
333. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 148, at 48 (citations omitted).
334. Tonry, supra note 45, at 1564 n.48.
335. Id.
336. United States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1994) (Oakes, J., concurring).
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Watts ruled that application of the preponderance standard to such
evidence is appropriate when considering evidence at sentencing. 337
However, there are no constraints on the types of evidence that may be
considered, provided that it can be proven by a mere preponderance of
the evidence. The language in § 3661 provides that “[n]o limitation
shall be placed” on the evidence that a judge may consider at
sentencing and the real offense sentencing. 338 It follows that such
evidence may include inadmissible hearsay; 339 acquitted conduct; 340
and even evidence obtained by unconstitutional means, including
coercion or torture. 341 Exacerbating the situation, real offense
sentencing has shifted sentencing power from the judiciary to
prosecutors. 342 The relevant conduct rules and cross-references were
based on concerns that a pure charge system would transfer power to
prosecutors and thereby increase disparities; however, since
prosecutors control “facts” disclosed to probation officers in preparing
the PSR, the rules “are not working as intended,” and “tend to work in
one direction, i.e., to the disadvantage of defendants.” 343
For instance, where acquitted conduct is involved, “[prosecutors
can] affect an end-run around the exclusionary rule by presenting
evidence at sentencing that would be inadmissible at trial.”344
Conversely, where charges were not brought or dropped, the same
charges “can be ‘proved’ in a presentence report.” 345 When there are
disputes regarding the “factual” statements in the PSR, the Government
need not produce the purported source of the information in court. 346
More troubling, perhaps, if the defendant contests the allegations, he or
she may lose an acceptance of responsibility reduction 347 and even
receive an enhancement for obstruction of justice. 348
337. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151, 157 (1997).
338. Doerr, supra note 264, at 249 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006)).
339. Id. at 250 (citations omitted); Ngov, supra note 1, at 239 (citations omitted).
340. Doerr, supra note 264, at 250 (citations omitted).
341. Id. (“[E]vidence obtained by a police officer by unconstitutional means, including
evidence obtained via coercion or torture, can be considered at sentencing. The
consequences is that a judge is unfettered in her consideration of the evidence at sentencing
so long as the judge and the judge alone determines that such evidence was proved by a
preponderance.”) (citations omitted).
342. See id.
343. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 25 (citations omitted).
344. Doerr, supra note 264, at 250.
345. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 25.
346. Id.
347. The Guidelines instruct the sentencing court to decrease a defendant’s offense level
by two levels if he “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (2012).
348. The Guidelines instruct the sentencing court to increase a defendant’s offense level
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In short, the relevant conduct provisions permits “prosecutors to
obtain, or threaten to obtain, the equivalent of a conviction on charges
that cannot be proved with competent evidence but are impossible to
challenge.” 349 This is tantamount to lowering the overall burden of
proof at trial. 350 This creates a “winner take all” 351 system: the
conviction on one-count of a multi-count indictment is sufficient to
trigger a Guideline range that is identical in terms of the penal
consequences to a defendant as if he was convicted on the basis of
allegations not proved, or even alleged in the trial phase. 352 With such
awesome power in the hand of the prosecutors, “[t]he inducement to
plead guilty may be irresistible even to a defendant with a strong
defense or who is actually innocent.” 353
E. The Use of Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing Undermines the Role of
the Jury
Acquitted conduct sentencing under the relevant conduct
provisions of the Guidelines undermines the hallmark of the American
judicial process: the right to trial by jury. 354 The Sixth Amendment
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” 355 However,
the consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing under the relevant
conduct provisions of the Guidelines renders this right wholly illusory
for three reasons. First, while the jury is charged exclusively with
by two levels if he “wilfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the
instant offense of conviction” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2012).
For further discussion see Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 25 (citing Margareth Etienne,
The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal Courts: An Empirical
Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425 (2004)).
349. Baron-Evans, supra note 132, at 25.
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. See id.
353. Id. at 26 (citing The American College of Trial Lawyers Proposed Modifications to
the Relevant Conduct Provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1463, 1492–93 (2001); David Yallen, Illusion, Illogic and Injustice: Real Offense
Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 449 (1993);
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 274 (1989)).
354. See sources cited supra note 11.
355. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also Doerr, supra note 264 at 252 (“To the layperson,
the Sixth Amendment means that if there is the potential that one may be subjected to
penalty for a criminal offense, any verdict must be rendered by a jury, unless otherwise
waived.”).
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deciding questions of fact, its fact-finding role is eviscerated by the
Guidelines’ requirement that a district court must enhance a
defendant’s sentence based on acquitted conduct. 356 For example,
consider the following colloquy between defense counsel and a
sentencing judge:
The Court: The jury could not have made—the jury could not have
listened to the instructions . . . .
...
[The Court:] The testimony was so strong. The Gun was even in the
apartment. That’s all they needed. There was no dispute of that
fact. . .
Mr. Barroso: They perhaps didn’t believe it was being used in
association with drug-[Counsel]related activity, your Honor.
The Court: Well, I’ll tell you something: I have been disappointed
in jury verdicts before this firearm was used . . . .

...
[The Court:] They [the jury] had to absolutely disregard the
testimony of a government agent for no reason—no reason.
Mr. Barroso: Perhaps they considered the testimony of the other
agent who testified that he [Counsel] couldn’t be sure, your Honor.
The Court: Well, you can take it up with an appellate court,
357
because I’ve made my findings on the record.

Fundamentally, such action allows the judge to usurp the role of
the jury. 358 As Judge Gertner has noted, “[t]o tout the importance of
the jury in deciding facts, even traditional sentencing facts, and then to
ignore the fruits of its efforts makes no sense—as a matter of law or
logic.” 359
Second, disregarding the “not guilty” verdict of the jury is
“quintessential unauthorized punishment.” 360 Every state constitution
written between 1776 and 1787 unanimously guaranteed only one
right: the right of trial by jury in criminal cases. 361 Contravening a
356. See Semones, supra note 11, at 315.
357. United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 748–49 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)
(upholding lower court’s sentence enhancement for conduct of which the defendant was
acquitted). See also Gertner, supra note 317, at 434 (“At sentencing, the Court pronounced
identical prison terms for both defendants: seventy-six months. While the Guideline range
for DeLuna was 76 months, because he had been convicted of the weapons charge, it was
less for Juarez-Ortega, who had been acquitted on that charge.” (citing Juarez-Ortega, 866
F.2d at 748)).
358. Semones, supra note 11, at 315.
359. See United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 153 (D. Mass. 2005).
360. Bilsborrow, supra note 3, at 321–23.
361. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183
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jury’s verdict of guilt or innocence undermines the jury from fulfilling
its key role: “protect[ing] ordinary individuals against governmental
overreach[].” 362
Third, to the layperson, the right to trial by jury is one of the very
few complicated legal issues with which the general public is familiar,
and faith in the jury system is of vital importance to the legitimacy of
the entire Anglo-American legal system. 363 The jury, as an institution,
also provides an opportunity for lay citizens to become both pupils of
and participants in the legal and political system. 364 Tocqueville
commented that the jury “may be regarded as a gratuitous public
school, ever open, in which every juror learns his rights.” 365 For
example, consider the following letter from a juror to a defendant’s
sentencing judge:
We, the jury, all took our charge seriously. We virtually gave up
our private lives to devote our time to the cause of justice . . . .
What does it say to our contribution as jurors when we see our
366
verdicts, in my personal view, not given their proper weight.

Thus, a sentence that repudiates the jury’s verdict undermines the
juror’s role as both a pupil and participant in civic affairs and is the
“type of deviation from the public’s understanding of a defendant’s
right to a jury trial that could undermine public confidence in the
criminal justice system.” 367
F. Alleyne and the Continuing Fiction of the Punishment-Enhancement
Distinction
More recently, the Supreme Court was provided another
opportunity to put an end to acquitted conduct sentencing in Stroud v.
United States, 368 yet, it denied certiorari. 369 Nevertheless, it granted
certiorari on a narrower issue involving judge-found facts, which
(1991).
362. Id.
363. Doerr, supra note 264, at 252. See also Theodore Dalrymple, Trial by Human
Beings: the Jury System and Its Discontents, NAT’L REV., Apr. 25, 2005, at 30.
364. ALBERT W. DZUR, PUNISHMENT, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, AND THE JURY
13 (2012).
365. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 128 (Richard D. Heffner ed.,
1956). See Amar, supra note 361, at 1186; Johnson, supra note 8, at 185.
366. Doerr, supra note 264, at 252 (quoting Letter from Juror #6 in United States v. Ball,
to Hon. Richard W. Roberts, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (May 16, 2008)). See
McElhatton, supra note 27.
367. Doerr, supra note 264, at 252. See DZUR, supra note 364, at 68–69.
368. United States v. Stroud, 673 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1581
(2013).
369. Id.
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increased the mandatory minimum, in Alleyne v. United States. 370
In Alleyne, the trial court imposed a seven-year sentence on a defendant
for having “brandished” a firearm while “using or carrying [it] during
and in relation to a crime of violence.” 371 At trial, the jury had found
only that the defendant used or carried the firearm, which carried a
five-year mandatory minimum sentence. 372 However, the judge,
relying on Harris, found that the defendant had “brandished” the
firearm, and thereby increased the defendant’s mandatory minimum
sentence to seven years. 373 The Supreme Court held that the
defendant’s seven-year mandatory minimum sentence violated his
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury because the question of
brandishing was never submitted to the jury. 374 The Court’s opinion
overruled Harris and explicitly held that there is no basis in principle
or logic to distinguish facts that raise the statutory maximum, such as
in Apprendi, from those that increase the statutory minimum. 375 In
other words, the Court clarified that Apprendi requires a jury to find all
facts that fix the penalty range of a crime: the mandatory minimum is
just as important to the statutory range as is the statutory maximum. 376
However, more importantly, the Court made clear that its holding
was not designed to limit the discretion of the trial judge in imposing
sentences within the range defined by the statutory maximum and
mandatory minimum. In fact, the Court reaffirmed that its ruling does
not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found
by a jury. 377 Thus, the use of acquitted conduct under the relevant
conduct provisions of the Guidelines remains entirely permissible,
provided, however, that it does not increase the statutory maximum
sentence or any applicable mandatory minimum sentence.378
So, what happens when a Court seeks to punish defendants upon
the insistence of prosecutors under the now advisory Guideline regime
when a jury finds the proof wanting? Just as before, the same old story
plays out. While sentencing judges post-Booker and its progeny now
have the discretion to disagree with the Guidelines, the starting point at
sentencing is still to calculate the appropriate Guideline range under the

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2156–64 (2013).
Id. at 2156.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2163–64.
Id. at 2163.
See id.
Id.
See, e.g., Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010).
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“modified-real offense” approach to sentencing. 379 Many sentencing
judges now serving in the federal judiciary were appointed in the postGuideline era; all they have known is Guideline Sentencing. 380
Further, post-Booker era empirical research has shown that downward
departures from the applicable Guideline range, in the absence of
Government sponsored substantial assistance motions, still remains the
exception, not the rule, in federal court. 381 Fundamentally, the status
quo has not noticeably changed. This blind adherence to the
Guidelines, what Judge Gertner terms as “anchoring,” 382 continues to
derogate “the historical and constitutionally guaranteed right of
criminal defendants to demand that the jury decide guilt or innocence
on every issue, which includes application of the laws to the facts.” 383
Why didn’t the Court go further? As explained by Justice Breyer,
the crucial fifth vote in Alleyne, the fiction . . . of the punishment
enhancement distinction” provides the answer: 384
there is a traditional distinction between elements of a crime (facts
constituting the crime typically for the jury to determine) and
sentencing facts (facts affecting the sentence, often concerning,
e.g., the manner in which the offender committed the crime, and
typically for the judge to determine).
...
The early historical references that this Court’s opinions have set
forth . . . refer to offense elements, not to sentencing facts. Thus,
when Justice Story wrote that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
trial by jury offered ‘securit[y] against the prejudice of judges,’ he
was likely referring to elements of a crime; and the best answer to
Justice Scalia’s implicit question in Apprendi—what, exactly, does
the ‘right to trial by jury’ guarantee?—is that it guarantees a jury’s

379. Lynn S. Adelman et al., Federal Sentencing Under “Advisory” Guidelines:
Observations by District Judges, 75 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1, 15–20 (2006).
380. See, e.g., id. at 4, 12.
381. A Year After Booker: Most Sentences Still Within Guidelines, THIRD BRANCH (Feb.
2006),
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/06-0201/A_Year_After_Booker_Most_Sentences_Still_Within_Guidelines.aspx. For statistics
after the Supreme Court’s post Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) and Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, POST-KIMBROUGH/GALL
DATA
REPORT
tbl.
1
(2008),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Kimbrough_Gall/U
SSC_Kimbrough_Gall_Report_Final_FY2008.pdf (noting a slight uptick from 12.2% to
13.8% in non-government sponsored downward departures in sentencing).
382. Adelman, supra note 379, at 17.
383. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513 (1995).
384. See Brief for Appellate at 18, United States v. Johnson (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 083033), 2014 WL 982870 at *18 (citing Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2165–167 (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
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In contrast, in a dissenting opinion in Oregon v. Ice,386 in which
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Souter and Thomas joined, Justice
Scalia emphasized that the right to jury trial guarantee, “turns upon the
penal consequences attached to the fact, and not its formal definition as
an element of the crime.” 387 However, while the Ice dissent stirred up
hope for a unique grouping of Justices to grant a writ of certiorari and
decide the acquitted conduct sentencing issue, 388 Stroud and Alleyne
have proved that the time has not yet come.
CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrated that the practice of acquitted conduct
sentencing under the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines
cannot be justified by the two overarching theories of punishment:
retributivism or utilitarianism. Further, punishment for acquitted or
uncharged conduct cannot be justified on the basis of bad character
alone without upending the legitimacy of the criminal process. There
are increasing calls from numerous sentencing courts, appellate courts,
and even Supreme Court justices echoing the academic commentary of
the past two decades, urging the end of judicial consideration of
acquitted conduct at sentencing within the relevant conduct provisions
of the Sentencing Guidelines. 389
Fundamentally, acquitted conduct sentencing undermines the
justifications for punishment by the state. It impairs the substantive
criminal law by weakening the foundational principle of the American
criminal justice system. It results in substantially longer sentences than
would otherwise be warranted and accentuates inherent racial
disparities under the federal sentencing guidelines. Furthermore, it
weakens the criminal burden of proof and law of evidence. In addition,
it attacks and weakens the jury as an institution by devaluing its role,
function and purpose. These observations not only lead to adverse
empirical consequences for defendants, but they also reflect bad policy.
Despite these complaints, the Supreme Court’s Stroud and Alleyne
decisions demonstrate that it is far from ready to meaningfully limit
385. Id. (citing Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2165–67 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
386. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009). For a detailed discussion see Doerr, supra
note 264, at 247–49.
387. Ice, 555 U.S. at 173 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
388. Doerr, supra note 264, at 249.
389. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl. 13 (June 2010), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Research_Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_
Survey.pdf.

YALINCAK FINAL

2014]

8/21/2014 4:07 PM

ACQUITTED CONDUCT SENTENCING

721

judicial fact-finding where it impacts the measure of penal
consequences to a defendant, not just the “range” of penal sanctions,
especially since it has underpinned more than three decades of its postSRA sentencing case law.
However, more importantly, on a legislative and policy level,
simply prohibiting the use of acquitted conduct under the relevant
conduct provisions of the Guidelines without addressing the conflicting
philosophies and rationales of punishment in the SRA would miss the
wood for the trees. After almost three decades of sentencing under the
SRA, sentencing policy in the federal system is fragmented: there is no
overarching model, theory, or rationale. 390 Under both the previously
mandatory and the current (advisory system) of Guideline sentencing,
courts have struggled to reconcile the SRA with its mutually competing
and conflicting goals with a defendant’s constitutional rights. Thus, in
the absence of an overriding theory or model of the purposes of
punishment, with a primary rationale, the door would be left wide open
for clever sentencing judges, anchored in decades of Guideline
sentencing, to pick and choose from the § 3553(a) factors to return to
the status quo ante.
Judges are not “sentencing experts,” 391 and relying on the
individual whims of sentencing judges can serve to perpetuate and
compound the problem and increase sentencing disparities. Sentencing
judges need guidance to structure their discretion when imposing
sentence on a defendant. The lack of clear direction on the purposes of
punishment in the present system of plural aims, would not only
continue the current “cafeteria” system 392 of sentencing—permitting
judges “a freedom to determine [penal] policy, rather than freedom to
respond to an unusual combination of facts” 393 and maintaining
“sentencing anarchy,” 394—but also give the system an unfortunate and
illusory cloak of constitutionality. Instead, since the Constitutional
concerns are directly related to the purposes of punishment, the
constitutional and normative concerns should be simultaneously
addressed through an overarching aim for sentencing or a primary
390. Tonry, supra note 157, at 1.
391. Judge Gertner has written extensively on this issue. See Gertner, supra note 61, at
696; Gertner, supra note 317, at 421–22. It is also important to note that most law schools
in the United States do not even require a course in criminology or criminological theories
as a part of the J.D. program. Rather it is a second year elective that most law students, in
the rush to secure lucrative jobs, probably avoid.
392. GERALDINE MACKENZIE, HOW JUDGES SENTENCE 85 (2005) (citing ASHWORTH,
supra note 275, at 63).
393. Id. (quoting ASHWORTH, supra note 275, at 63).
394. Id. (quoting Ashworth, supra note 276, at 350).
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rationale or model that incorporates robust evidentiary and procedural
protections for the defendant. For instance, such reforms could include
a prescription that “just deserts should be an overarching aim” or that
“deterrent sentences” must be given to housebreakers, white collar
offenders, or drug offenders, limited by the principle of parsimony, and
requiring any relevant conduct evidence to be presented to the jury in a
sentencing phase, or using special verdict forms at trial and structuring
sentencers’ discretion and opportunity to circumvent the purposes of
sentencing. 395

395. MACKENZIE, supra note 392, at 85.

